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The lawfulness of gender reassignment surgery 
Penney Lewis 
Abstract 
In the common law world, both the medical and legal professions initially 
considered gender reassignment surgery to be unlawful when first practised and 
discussed in the first half of the twentieth century. While most medical 
procedures are covered by the medical exception to the law governing serious 
offences against the person, many doctors and the lawyers they consulted 
doubted that this exception applied to gender reassignment surgery. In this 
article I trace the differing and changing interpretations of the medical exception 
as applied to gender reassignment surgery, and the shift towards legal 
acceptance in the two common law jurisdictions which led the way in both 
performing gender reassignment surgery and debating its legality, the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Although this shift occurred without formal legal 
intervention through either legislation or judicial decision (for example on a test 
case), inferences of legality drawn from related civil law decisions bolstered the 
legal acceptance of gender reassignment surgery. 
By increasing the suffering of patients and potential patients, the criminal law 
played both an important and primarily malign role prior to the eventual public, 
professional and legal acceptance of GRS. A real threat of criminal prosecution 
                                                        

 Professor  of Law, Centre of Medical Law & Ethics, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College 
London. I am grateful to the conference participants at ‘Transforming wrong(s) into right(s): The 
power of ‘proper medical treatment’ held at the University of Manchester, to the Wellcome Trust 
for a research expenses grant in their medical humanities programme which supported this 
research, and to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their extremely helpful comments. 
Penney Lewis, ‘The lawfulness of gender reassignment surgery’, American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 57, 2017 (forthcoming) 
 2 
inhibited doctors from proceeding, distorted diagnoses and affected the kinds of 
procedures performed. After-care was expanded and manipulated to avoid the 
risk of prosecution or the appearance of unlawful surgery. By contrast, civil and 
administrative law played a more positive albeit indirect role in interpreting the 
medical exception and its application to gender reassignment surgery. 
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Introduction 
In common law jurisdictions, in the absence of specific criminal offences,1 
medical practice is regulated by the criminal law in two main ways.2 First, by the 
law governing serious offences against the person, which includes aggravated 
assault,3 assault causing actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm (often 
reworded as a form of serious assault), and wounding.4 Second, by the crime of 
maim or mayhem,5 which is a common law crime in some jurisdictions, including 
England and Wales,6 and a statutory offence in others, including Canada7 and 
most American states.8 Either at common law or in statute, a medical exception 
exists which takes most medical treatment outside of both of these strands of the 
criminal law.9  
In this article I begin by sketching the contours of the medical exception and 
explaining how and why the medical and legal professions initially viewed 
                                                        
1 For example, offences preventing or restricting access to abortion. See generally, MA Glendon, 
Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Harvard University Press 1987) 10-62. 
2 If death is caused, other offences may also be relevant including homicide, manslaughter, 
murder (eg in euthanasia cases) and assisted suicide. 
3 In the United States, see American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries: (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments): With Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual 
Meeting of the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (1980), § 211(2). In 
Canada, see Criminal Code, Rsc 1985, C C-46, s 268. 
4 In England and Wales, see Offences against the Person Act (Oapa), ss 18, 20, 47. 
5 The two words are equivalent. State v Johnson 58 Ohio St 417, 423 (1898, Ohio Supreme Court). 
6 Wright’s Case (1604) 1 CoLit 127a, 127b; JF Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (FH Thomas 
1878) 145-146; Bravery v Bravery [1954] 1 WLR 1169, 1180 (CA), Denning LJ, dissenting. In 
1994, Lord Mustill, dissenting in Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, 262 (HL), considered the common law 
crime of maim to be “obsolete” although it has “not been expressly abolished” (PDG Skegg, Law, 
Ethics and Medicine (Clarendon Press 1984) 43). 
7 Maim is now incorporated within the crime of aggravated assault. Criminal Code (n 3) s 268.  
8 Kitchens v State 7 SE 209 (1888, Ga) (on the application of the statutory crime of mayhem to 
female genitalia); State v Bass 255 NC 42, 120 SE 2d 580 (1961, NC SC) (defendant doctor was 
criminally liable as accessory before the fact to mayhem for anaesthetizing hand of consenting 
victim who had hand cut off in pursuit of insurance fraud). See JR Monaghan, 'Consent as Defense 
to Charge of Mayhem' (1962) 86 ALR2d 268; ER Milhizer, 'Maiming as a Criminal Offense under 
Military Law' (1991) Army Lawyer 5; WR LaFave, 'Mayhem' (2015) 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 
16.15. 
9 Stephen, Digest (n 6) 144, art 204, n 1. A more extensive examination of the medical exception 
and its relationship to new and controversial medical procedures is found in P Lewis, 'The 
Medical Exception' (2012) 65 CLP 355. 
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gender reassignment surgery (GRS) as falling outside it, focusing primarily on 
the two common law jurisdictions which led the way in both performing GRS and 
debating its legality, the United States and the United Kingdom. I then trace the 
differing and changing interpretations of the medical exception as applied to GRS 
from the first procedures in the early twentieth century, the shift towards legal 
acceptance in the 1960s and the under-explored role of inferences of legality 
drawn from related civil law decisions in the 1970s. I conclude by assessing the 
impact of this period of legal uncertainty. 
The medical exception in the context of GRS 
In order to qualify for the medical exception, two elements must be present. 
First, the patient’s consent is required, although some substitute for consent will 
suffice when the patient is unable to consent. This substitute may take the form 
of consent from another person in a prescribed relationship to the patient,10 or it 
may be entirely separate from consent, taking the form of a justification such as 
necessity or best interests.11 Given its focus on GRS, this article will only consider 
patients who are able to provide a valid consent. 
Second, some form of public policy justification is required.12 The requirement of 
a public policy justification is often expressed by asking whether the patient can 
validly consent,13 or asserting that the patient cannot validly consent.14 To make 
                                                        
10 See, eg, Crimes Act 1961, s 61A (NZ); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (n 3) § 
3.08(4)(b). 
11 See, eg, Brown (n 6) 266. 
12 See, eg, G Hughes, 'Two Views on Consent in the Criminal Law' (1963) 26 MLR 233, 237.  
13 See, eg, G Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber & Faber 1958) 102. 
14 See, eg, DK Smith, 'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law' (1971) 56 Cornell 
L Rev 963, 988-989.  
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clearer the need for a public policy justification, one should rather ask whether 
the patient’s consent is consistent with public policy.15  
Consensus over the terminology used for the public policy justification, and over 
its content, is notable by its absence. The different versions of this public policy 
justification focus variously on the patient, the public, and the medical 
profession.  
Patient-focused public policy justifications 
Patient-focused justifications mandate that the procedure be intended to benefit 
the patient’s health or be therapeutic for the patient. Some versions of this type 
of public policy justification impose a requirement that the performance of the 
procedure be “reasonable”,16 but others do not.17 To avoid problems with 
unsuccessful procedures, the focus is on the doctor’s intention to benefit the 
patient rather than actual benefit.18 For example, the American Model Penal Code 
contains an exception for “a doctor or other therapist” who uses force “for the 
purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment that the actor believes 
to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient”.19  
In Corbett v. Corbett, the earliest English legal case to touch on the lawfulness of 
GRS, Ormrod J applied a broad patient-focused public policy justification to 
conclude rather opaquely that:  
                                                        
15 SD Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2009) [4.6]. 
16 See, eg, Criminal Bill Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the 
Law Relating to Indictable Offences (Cmd 2345, 1878-1879); Criminal Code (n 3) s 45; Crimes Act 
1961 (n 10) s 61; Criminal Code (Queensland), s 282; Criminal Code (Western Australia), s 259. 
17 See, eg, Corbett v Corbett [1971] 2 P 83 (1970, HC), discussed in the text accompanying n 20.  
18 In the context of GRS, see Doe v State, Dept of Public Welfare 257 NW 2d 816, 821 (1977, Minn 
Supreme Court) (rejecting requirement that applicant for public funding demonstrate 
conclusively that GRS would be successful).  
19 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (n 3) §§ 2.11(2), 3.08(4). 
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There is obviously room for differences of opinion on the ethical 
aspects of such [gender reassignment] operations but, if they are 
undertaken for genuine therapeutic purposes, it is a matter for the 
decision of the patient and the doctors concerned in his case.20  
Of course accepting that a procedure such as GRS could be justified using a 
patient-focused public policy justification does not mean that all GRS is so 
justifiable—the therapeutic nature of the procedure will need to be established 
in each case.21 The American prosecutor Stan Twardy identified some cases 
where  
surgery was offered on demand without any attempt to determine the 
mental stability of the patient, [or] where the surgeon acted with total 
disregard of accepted screening practices within the surgical and 
psychiatric professions… In some such cases, [a] prosecutor would 
have no difficulty in convincing [a] jury that the defendant was not 
interested in the patient’s welfare and did not act in the patient’s best 
interest, but acted merely for his own financial gain.22  
Public-focused public policy justifications 
Public-focused justifications vary in specificity, although they are generally 
broader than a patient-focused justification, ranging from the relatively narrow 
“just cause or excuse”23 or “lawful purpose”24 to the broader “public interest”.25 
Such justifications are often used when a third-party beneficiary or obvious 
societal benefit is present.26  
                                                        
20 Corbett v Corbett (n 17) 99. In this case the marriage between Arthur Corbett and April Ashley, 
a male to female transsexual, was nullified or declared void on the grounds that Ashley was “not 
a woman for the purposes of marriage but is a biological male and has been so since birth.” ibid 
106. 
21 In the context of GRS, see, eg, Doe v State (n 18) 820-821. 
22 S Twardy, 'Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism' (1980) 26 Medical Trial Technique 
Quarterly 249, 295-296. 
23 Bravery (n 6) 1180. 
24 See, eg, Crimes Act 1961 (n 10) s 61A; RE Ross and GB McClure (eds), A Treatise on Crimes and 
Misdemeanors [Russell on Crimes], vol 1 (8th edn, Stevens 1923) 847. 
25 See, eg, Criminal Bill Commission, Report (n 16) s 159; Bravery (n 6) 1175, 1180; Attorney 
General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, 719 (CA) (Lord Lane CJ); P Skegg, 'Medical 
Procedures and the Crime of Battery' [1974] Crim LR 693, 696 (discussing the difference 
between the “just cause or excuse” approach and the “injurious to the public interest” approach). 
26 For example live organ donation, contraceptive sterilisation or non-therapeutic research. 
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In the context of the procedures involved in GRS, members of the legal 
profession rarely used public-focused public policy justifications in support of 
GRS.27 Lawyers and judges did occasionally use the language of the public-
focused justification to express the lack of such a justification. One such example 
is found in the English case of Cowburn. A prisoner who had been convicted of 
sexual offences had consented to castration. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
refused to declare the operation lawful on the grounds that the question was not 
before the court.28 Considering both the facts of Cowburn and the example of a 
male to female (MTF) transsexual seeking GRS, Thomas James concluded in 1969 
that: 
It would seem most doubtful whether, in England today, the facts of R. 
v. Cowburn could provide a just cause for the operation. Indeed, 
orchidectomy [castration] in any circumstances would seem 
unjustifiable in the eyes of the law in England, having regard to the 
present understanding of the subject.29 
Professionally-focused public policy justifications 
Professionally-focused public policy justifications include “proper medical 
treatment”30 and “reasonable surgical interference”.31 The use of adjectives such 
as “proper”, “reasonable” and “necessary” suggests some role for a court in 
                                                        
27 Unless the terms of a statutory medical exception reflect this form of public policy justification. 
For example, Skegg and Patterson argue that the statutory medical exception in the Crimes Act 
1961 (n 10) s 61A permitting operations “for a lawful purpose” can now be applied to GRS. PDG 
Skegg, R Paterson and J Manning, Medical Law in New Zealand (Thomson Brookers 2006) 
[5.3.4(2)] and see below, n 216.  
28 G Williams, 'Consent and Public Policy' [1962] Crim LR 74, 159; Skegg, Law, Ethics and 
Medicine (n 6) 45. On Cowburn, see also, JDJ Havard, 'R v. Cowburn' [1959] Crim LR 554; 
'Cowburn' [1959] Crim LR 590; R v. Cowburn The Times, 12 May 1959 (Court of Criminal 
Appeal); EM Wellwood, 'Medicine and the Law' (1959) 273 The Lancet 1090. 
29 TE James, 'Legal Issues of Transsexualism in England' in R Green and J Money (eds), 
Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1969) 447 [emphasis 
added].  
30 See, eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 891 (HL); Brown (n 6) 266, 231, 245, 276; 
GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (W Green & Son 1967) 774-775; Skegg, Paterson and 
Manning, Medical Law in New Zealand (n 27) [5.3.4(2)]. 
31 See, eg, A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) (n 25) 719 (“as needed in the public interest”); Brown (n 
6) 245 (“reasonable surgery”) or 242 (“necessary surgery”).  
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evaluating medical practice. An even more professionally-focused justification 
simply reflects “good”,32 “accepted” or “recognized”33 medical practice, on the 
grounds that the “[c]ontrols exercised by the medical profession itself should be 
accepted as sufficient.”34 How a particular medical practice becomes “accepted” 
or “recognised” is unclear.35 
Early on, doctors and lawyers who applied a professionally-focused public policy 
justification to GRS usually did so in order to exclude it from the medical 
exception. In 1953, Alfred C. Kinsey wrote that GRS was “beyond acceptable 
medical practice”.36 In 1962, the Journal of the American Medical Association’s 
Legal Department advised an Illinois physician who had been approached by a 
“transvestite” seeking castration and penectomy that the patient’s consent 
“would not afford any defense if it were found that performance of the 
operations in the circumstances of the case were contrary to good medical 
practice in the community.”37  
GRS outside the medical exception 
                                                        
32 See, eg, Brown (n 6) 258-259.  
33 See, eg, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (n 3) § 3.08(4); RP Kouri, Certain Legal 
Aspects of Modern Medicine (Sex Reassignment and Sterilization) (Institute of Comparative Law, 
McGill University 1975) 75. 
34 G Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1983) 590. See also, B 
Starkman, 'A Defence to Criminal Responsibility for Performing Surgical Operations: Section 45 
of the Criminal Code' (1981) 26 McGill LJ 1048, 1055. For a critical view of this approach, see P 
Alldridge, 'Consent to Medical and Surgical Treatment—the Law Commission's 
Recommendations' (1996) 4 Medical L Rev 129, 137-138, 139, commenting on Law Commission 
of England and Wales, Consent and Offences against the Person (CP 134, 1994). 
35 Starkman, 'A Defence to Criminal Responsibility for Performing Surgical Operations' (n 34) 
1055. See the Editor’s Note on the first page of the article. 
36 J Meyerowitz, 'Sex Research at the Borders of Gender: Transvestites, Transsexuals, and Alfred 
C. Kinsey' (2001) 75 Bulletin of the History of Medicine 72, 88. 
37 RP Bergen, 'Questions and Answers: Transvestism Surgery' (1962) 182 JAMA 885, 888. 
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Beginning in the early twentieth century, GRS was practised first on animals and 
then on “transvestites” by the 1920s and 1930s.38 Transsexualism, “defined in 
part by the request for surgical sex change, did not appear as a medical category 
until the late 1940s and early 1950s.”39 Leading endocrinologists including Harry 
Benjamin40 and Christian Hamburger41 viewed the demand for GRS from both 
men and women as signifying an as-yet undiscovered hormonal or other 
physiological abnormality which could be treated using existing plastic surgery 
techniques.42 Worldwide, medical opinion on the appropriateness and ethics of 
GRS was polarised with little consensus on issues of diagnosis and treatment. As 
one American psychiatrist wrote of both MTF and female to male (FTM) 
transsexuals, these differences of clinical opinion were exacerbated because “the 
situation of the person requesting a change of sex … involve[s] sex and ha[s] 
been [a] tabooed topic[] and … give[s] rise to strong personal sentiment and 
convictions, resulting in reactions and counter-reactions, with moral and 
religious overtones.”43 The patients and their demands were not the only source 
of ethical controversy. GRS required plastic and especially cosmetic surgery. 
                                                        
38 JJ Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States (Harvard 
University Press 2002) 2, 29-35. 
39 ibid 2. See also, M Dillon, Self: A Study in Ethics and Endocrinology (Heinemann 1946) 60-65. 
40 See K Schilt, 'Harry Benjamin', Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc 2015); J 
Meyerowitz, 'Benjamin, Harry (B. 12 January 1885; D. 24 August 1986), Endocrinologist, Expert 
on Transsexuality, Advocate for Transsexuals.' in M Stein (ed), Encyclopedia of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender History in America, vol 1 (Charles Scribner's Sons/Thomson/Gale 
2004).  
41 See J Starup, 'Christian Hamburger' (1974) 75 Acta Endocrinologica 1. 
42 BL Hausman, Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender (Duke 
University Press 1995) 46. 
43 IB Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (1968) 147 The Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease 460, 467. See also, 'Review of the Principles and Art of Plastic 
Surgery Sir Harold Gillies, C.B.E., F.R.C.S.; D. Ralph Millard, Jr., M.D. London: Butterworth. 1957. 
Pp. 652. £12 10s. (in Two Volumes).' (1958) 271 The Lancet 945, 946. A flavour of the early 
controversy can be gleaned from the responses to C Hamburger, GK Sturup and E Dahl-Iversen, 
'Transvestism; Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical Treatment' (1953) 152 JAMA 391 in which 
the authors recounted their experience of providing GRS in Denmark. See, eg, M Ostow, 
'Transvestism' (1953) 152 JAMA 1553; GH Wiedeman, 'Transvestism' (1953) 152 JAMA 1167. 
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Other physicians already viewed this branch of medicine with scepticism, raising 
concerns about poorly-trained, irresponsible charlatans exploiting vulnerable 
patients.44 As Benjamin noted, “[t]he [early plastic] surgeons were bitterly 
criticized, were refused membership in medical societies, and were branded by 
some of their colleagues as quacks. And sex was not even involved then!”45 In 
addition, many doctors had a “natural reluctance to remove healthy organs in 
the absence of somatic pathology.”46 
From a legal perspective, GRS was particularly problematic for two reasons. 
First, the law of maim or mayhem explicitly included castration. Second, none of 
the public policy justifications were readily available. In the absence of either 
professional or public consensus, debate raged over the patient-focused public 
policy justification. Strong views that the surgery was “mutilating” made it 
difficult to establish that the procedure benefitted rather than harmed patients.  
Castration as maim or mayhem 
The common law historically regarded castration as a maim or mayhem. Thus it 
was difficult to argue that the law of maim or mayhem did not apply to the MTF 
procedure (though as we shall see, one leading American commentator directly 
challenged this reading of the law of maim). In theory the medical exception 
could have been applied to procedures which would otherwise constitute maim 
or mayhem, most obviously if the procedure would save the patient’s life or 
                                                        
44 Hausman, Changing Sex (n 42) 51-52, citing G Aufricht, 'The Development of Plastic Surgery in 
the United States' (1946) 1 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery 3, 21. 
45 H Benjamin, 'Nature and Management of Transsexualism, with a Report on Thirty-One 
Operated Cases' (1964) 72 Western Journal of Surgery, Obstetrics, and Gynecology 105, 110. 
46 Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (n 33) 60. 
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prevent deterioration in their physical health. 47  However discussion of 
castration as maim or mayhem rarely progressed to any public policy 
justification. Instead, the legal debate raged over whether castration did or did 
not constitute maim or mayhem; the underlying assumption apparently being 
that this was determinative of its legality.48 This made the threat of criminal 
prosecution extremely powerful, creating a significant chilling effect on the 
performance of GRS. This was particularly true in the USA,49 where relatively 
recent and expansive50 mayhem statutes made the threat of prosecution very 
real. Courts interpreted these statutes broadly; if they did not explicitly include 
female genitalia, judges inferred such an inclusion, making them potentially 
applicable to FTM procedures.51 In contrast, in those jurisdictions where maim 
                                                        
47 J Miller and G Dean, 'Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations' (1930) 16 American 
Bar Association Journal 158, 158-159; Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine (n 6) 45; Monaghan, 
'Consent as Defense to Charge of Mayhem' (n 8); Milhizer, 'Maiming as a Criminal Offense under 
Military Law' (n 8) 8. 
48 See, eg, K Walker and P Fletcher, Sex and Society: A Psychological Study of Sexual Behaviour in a 
Competitive Culture (Muller 1955) 195. 
49 Benjamin, 'Nature and Management of Transsexualism' (n 45) 110; H Benjamin, The 
Transsexual Phenomenon (Julian Press 1966) 142 (describing the law as “intimidat[ing] 
doctors”); R Green, 'Attitudes toward Transsexualism and Sex-Reassignment Procedures' in R 
Green and J Money (eds), Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (The Johns Hopkins University 
Press 1969) 240; DW Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (1968) 36 Medico-
Legal Journal 174, 182; DW Hastings, 'Inauguration of a Research Project on Transsexualism in a 
University Medical Center' in R Green and J Money (eds), Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press 1969) 243; RJ Tierney and TM O'Brien, 'You're a Good Man 
Charlotte Brown or What Now My Love?' (1968) 37 Hennepin Lawyer 4, 7; JP Holloway, 
'Transsexuals - Their Legal Sex' (1968) 40 University of Colorado L Rev 282, 284; J Money and F 
Schwartz, 'Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism: A Case Study in Medical Sociology' 
in R Green and J Money (eds), Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1969) 258; Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (n 43) 
467; DH Russell, 'The Sex-Conversion Controversy' (1968) 279 The New England Journal of 
Medicine 535, 536. In the United Kingdom, see PMF Bishop, ‘Discussion’ following the chapter by 
CN Armstrong, 'Transvestism' in D Robertson-Smith and WM Davidson (eds), Symposium on 
Nuclear Sex (Heinemann Medical Books 1958) 90. 
50 Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (n 33) 74; RC Donnelly, 'Liability of Physician 
for Sterilization in Virginia' (1951) 78 Virginia Medical Monthly 24, 25; FV Harper, 'Sex and the 
Law' in CW Lloyd (ed), Human Reproduction and Sexual Behaviour (Henry Kimpton 1964) 517. 
51 See, eg, Kitchens (n 8); Moore v State 3 Pin 373 (1851, Wisc). 
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remained a little-used common law offence, such as the UK, scholars more often 
disputed its continued relevance to medical practice.52 
The principal source for the view that castration constituted maim appears to be 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown: 
… such a Hurt of any Part of a Man’s Body, whereby he Is rendered 
less able in Fighting, either to defend himself or annoy his Adversary, 
is properly Maim. And Therefore the cutting off, or disabling, or 
weakening a Man’s Hand, or Finger, or striking out his Eye or Fore-
tooth, or castrating him, are said to be Maims, but the cutting off his 
Ear, or Nose, etc., are not esteemed Maims, because they do not 
weaken, but only disfigure him.53 
According to Hawkins, castration was a felony punishable by death.54 Noting this, 
Stephen confirmed that “Castration is a maim.” 55  Early American 56  and 
Canadian57 writers agreed, advancing two reasons for this; both related to the 
Crown’s interest in a strong military. First, castration “abates [a man’s] courage” 
thus “render[ing] him the less able in fighting”.58 Second, “[t]here were obvious 
                                                        
52 'The Legal Responsibility of the Surgeon' (1925) 205 The Lancet 931; LLM Minty, 'Unlawful 
Wounding: Will Consent Make It Legal?' (1956) 24 Medico-Legal Journal 54, 58-59; Skegg, Law, 
Ethics and Medicine (n 6) 43-44. 
53 W Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, vol 1 (3rd edn, 1739) 111-112 [emphasis 
added]. See, eg, HW Smith, 'Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery' (1941-
1942) 14 Rocky Mountain L Rev 233, 277, citing Hawkins. 
54 Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (n 53) 112.  
55 Stephen, Digest (n 6) 145; WO Russell and CS Greaves, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 
vol 1 (3rd edn, Saunders and Benning 1843) 719-720. 
56 J Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 
and of the Several States of the American Union with References to the Civil and Other Systems of 
Foreign Law (5th edn, printed for the estate of John Bouvier 1855) 209; JP Bishop, Commentaries 
on the Criminal Law (3rd edn, Little, Brown, and Company 1865), vol 1 §§ 568, 957, 969, 974, 
citing Commonwealth v Newell 7 Mass 245 (1810, SJC); Adams v Barrett 5 Ga 404 (1848, SC); 
Comonwealth v Lester 2 Va Cas 198 (1820, General Court), also mentioning The State v Absence 4 
Port 397 (1837, SC Ala) and contra The State v Thompson 30 Misso 470 (1860, SC); JW May, The 
Law of Crimes (Little, Brown, and Company 1881) § 180; WO Russell and CS Greaves, A Treatise 
on Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol 1 (7th edn, T & JW Johnson 1853) § 719.  
57 Prior to codification, the common law of maim in Canada included castration. GW Burbidge and 
JF Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law of Canada (Crimes and Punishments) Founded by 
Permission on Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law (Carswell & Co 1890) 199. 
58 SW Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4 (16th edn, T Cadell and J 
Butterworth and Son 1825) 205. See also, F Pulton, De Pace Regis Et Regni (Printed by Adam Islip 
for the Companie of Stationers 1609), fol 15, s 59; Russell on Crimes (n 24) 810; James, 'Legal 
Issues of Transsexualism in England' (n 29) 447; Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 34) 590. 
For an early American view, see Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law (n 56) § 568. 
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military objections to allowing a man to do or to undergo anything which 
disabled him from begetting sons.”59  
Lawyers first and rather mysteriously applied this conception of castration as 
maim to male sterilisation.60 When doctors later began receiving requests for 
GRS, commentators across the common law world pointed out the applicability 
of the law of maim or mayhem to castration: 
As such operations, entailing as they do castration, are illegal in this 
country [Great Britain] and in the United States, their search for a 
surgeon is very unlikely to be successful.61 
In the United States, concerns grew within the medical profession about the 
lawfulness of GRS in the late 1940s and into the 1950s.62 Harry Benjamin, one of 
the leading physicians treating transsexuals, wrote in 1953: 
“Conversion operations” have mainly been performed in [continental] 
Europe because in the U.S.A. they are illegal … The law offers no 
human or scientific understanding for the problem of the male 
transvestites … If they qualify for a feminizing operation and can find 
a surgeon competent and willing to perform it, the law steps in and 
forbids the operation as “mayhem.” This at least is the situation in the 
United States.63 
Benjamin’s colleague Alfred C. Kinsey agreed with this assessment of the 
unlawfulness of GRS.64 In Canada, Keith Moore, a doctor, and Clifford Edwards, a 
                                                        
59 Department of Health (Great Britain), Report of the Departmental Committee on Sterilisation 
(Cmd 4485, 1934), [70]. This view of mayhem was also taken by Minty, 'Unlawful Wounding' (n 
52) 58. 
60 Miller and Dean, 'Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations' (n 47) 158-159; J Ellison 
and others, Sex Ethics. The Principles and Practice of Contraception, Abortion, and Sterilisation 
(Baillie & Co 1934) 219. 
61  Walker and Fletcher, Sex and Society (n 48) 195. See also, James, 'Legal Issues of 
Transsexualism in England' (n 29) 447. 
62 Hamburger, Sturup and Dahl-Iversen, 'Transvestism; Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical 
Treatment' (n 43) 395; Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 42-43. 
63 H Benjamin, 'Transvestism and Transsexualism' (1953) 7 International Journal of Sexology 12, 
14. The following year, Benjamin described the operation as “supposedly illegal”. H Benjamin, 
'Transsexualism and Transvestism as Psychosomatic and Somatopsychic Syndromes' (1954) 8 
American Journal of Psychotherapy 219, 229.  
64 Meyerowitz, 'Sex Research at the Borders of Gender' (n 36) 88-89. 
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lawyer, published a similar conclusion in journals aimed at both medical and 
legal professionals:  
What about the transvestite or sex deviate then? The medical 
profession in this country generally … tends to regard such surgery, 
as for example castration, upon a normal anatomical person as 
illegal.65 
However, one leading American legal commentator directly challenged the view 
that castration constituted maim, using a legally flawed though influential 
argument. Despite the significant historical evidence already described, and 
contemporaneous opinion to the contrary,66 including the opinion of local 
District Attorneys and state Attorneys General consulted about the lawfulness of 
castration,67 the American lawyer Robert Veit Sherwin argued that the offence of 
mayhem did not include castration.68 Much of the contemporaneous opinion 
stemmed from an influential article by Miller and Dean published in the 
American Bar Association Journal in 1930: 
such a[ sterilization] operation might result in liability for mayhem or 
maiming. This would be clearly true in case of castration because the 
effect of the operation is to change the entire physical character of the 
individual … Although no case has been found at the common law 
where a physician was held criminally liable for performing a 
                                                        
65 CHC Edwards, 'Recent Developments Concerning the Criteria of Sex and Possible Legal 
Implications' (1959) 31 Manitoba Bar News 115, 126. See also, KL Moore and CHC Edwards, 
'Medico-Legal Aspects of Intersexuality: Criteria of Sex: Part II' (1960) 83 Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 756, 759. 
66 See, eg, People v Kopke 376 Ill 171, 174 (1941, Supreme Court) and the sources cited in n 71. 
67 See nn 106-109 and accompanying text. 
68 RV Sherwin, 'The Legal Problem in Transvestism' (1954) 8 American Journal of Psychotherapy 
243, 244. The British academic lawyer Glanville Williams also asserted the lawfulness of 
castration, but without specific consideration of the law of maim and its application:  
The legality of castration (the de-sexing operation) is also in debate. Although no 
normal person would submit to such an operation, it may occasionally be 
recommended as the only way of obtaining relief from abnormalities in the sexual 
urge, and it is hard to suppose that in these cases) least, the judges would regard it 
as unlawful. 
Williams, 'Consent and Public Policy' (n 28) 159. Unlike Sherwin, Williams’ view did not influence 
medical practice, and his fellow legal academics were unconvinced. Even ten years later, the 
Canadian scholar Robert Kouri was “inclined to think that [Williams’] optimism is somewhat 
unfounded.” Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (n 33) 68. David Meyers also 
disagreed with Williams, describing his conclusion as “rather bold”. DW Meyers, The Human Body 
and the Law: A Medico-Legal Study (Edinburgh University Press 1970) 53. 
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castration operation upon a person with his consent, nevertheless 
criminal liability would seem to be certain in such a case in view of 
the gist and scope of the crime of mayhem and the attitude of the law 
toward the effect of consent in such cases. Of course justification or 
excuse might appear from the facts of the particular case which would 
absolve the surgeon from criminal liability.69  
Although Miller and Dean’s conclusion that castration was unlawful because it 
would “change the entire physical character of the individual” was not derived 
from the historical sources they cited, 70  it was picked up by later 
commentators.71  
Sherwin, like his friend Benjamin, was deeply frustrated by this use of mayhem: 
Rarely has the law been used in such a ridiculous and unscientific 
fashion. The Mayhem Statute has no connection, even in its origin, 
with anything remotely related to the subject under discussion. It was 
a king’s device in the days of yore to prevent his men from becoming 
useless as fighters in his army. He therefore made it a serious crime 
for a man to dismember in any way any limb or part of the body that 
would make him less able to fight.72  
Sherwin explained the basis of his view in a separate article published in the 
same year: 
Any part of the body needed by a soldier for fighting had a premium 
placed upon it by means of declaring it to be a severe crime if such a 
part were cut off. The cases very clearly indicate that such parts as an 
ear or a penis were not “limbs needed in the act of defending one’s 
king” and thus not within the statute. Nevertheless, for lack of an 
appropriate law, the mayhem statute has been extended to include 
any willful disfigurings of the body.73 
                                                        
69 Miller and Dean, 'Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations' (n 47) 158-159 [emphasis 
added]. 
70 J Bouvier and F Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, vol 1 (8th edn, West 
Publishing Company 1914) 430; Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (n 53) 107; JP 
Bishop, JM Zane and CFG Zollmann, Commentaries on the Criminal Law. Bishop on Criminal Law 
(9th edn, TH Flood and Co 1923) § 1001. 
71 See, eg, Smith, 'Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery' (n 53) 277 
(“Castration so alters the personality and physical constitution that its performance, even with 
consent, would doubtless constitute the crime of mayhem under the common law.”); Donnelly, 
'Liability of Physician for Sterilization in Virginia' (n 50) 26; Harper, 'Sex and the Law' (n 50) 517. 
72 Sherwin, 'The Legal Problem in Transvestism' (n 68) 244. 
73 RV Sherwin, 'Sex Crime—a Failure of the Law' (1954) 12 Bar Bulletin New York County 
Lawyers Association 116, 117-118. 
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In 1969, Sherwin repeated his views confusing castration with penectomy in a 
chapter in an important collection edited by Richard Green and John Money 
entitled Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment.74 
Although Sherwin was correct in relation to ears,75 his focus on the surgical 
removal of the penis—rather than on castration—was misleading. Whatever the 
authorities had to say about whether cutting off a penis constituted maim or 
mayhem,76 they were unanimous that castration was a very serious act of maim 
or mayhem, originally carrying the death penalty, and subsequently the only 
form of the crime to be considered a felony.77  
Nonetheless, Sherwin’s view that castration did not fall within the crime of 
mayhem was picked up by influential psychiatrists in papers presented at the 
annual meetings of the American Psychiatric Association, published in leading 
psychiatric and legal journals and medical texts,78 and in other chapters of 
                                                        
74 RV Sherwin, 'Legal Aspects of Male Transsexualism' in R Green and J Money (eds), 
Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1969) 421. 
75 Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (n 53) 111; Blackstone, Commentaries (n 58) 205. 
Although the position in relation to ears was altered by 37 Hen 8 C 6 1545. See Blackstone, 
Commentaries (n 58) 206-207. 
76 Many modern American mayhem or mayhem-replacement statutes include dismemberment 
which would cover penectomy. LaFave, 'Mayhem' (n 8) n 14, citing Cole v State 62 TexCrim 270 
(1911, Ct Crim App). 
77 Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (n 53) 111-112; Blackstone, Commentaries (n 58) 
206. See also, Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (n 33) 73; JP Holloway, 
'Transsexuals – Some Further Legal Considerations' (1972) 5 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of South Africa 71, 74, discussing State v Sheldon 169 P 37 (1917, SC Mont). Castration 
continues to be regarded as mayhem in the USA. LaFave, 'Mayhem' (n 8) § 16.5(c). 
78 KM Bowman and B Engle, 'Medicolegal Aspects of Transvestism' (1957) 113 The American 
Journal of Psychiatry 583, 584 (although by 1960 Bowman and Engle were less convinced by 
Sherwin’s argument that castration did not fall within the ambit of mayhem, citing only his 
admission that “it is generally regarded as coming within the proscription of the mayhem 
statutes” [emphasis added]. KM Bowman and B Engle, 'Sex Offenses: The Medical and Legal 
Implications of Sex Variations' (1960) 25 Law and Contemporary Problems 292, 307, citing 
Sherwin, 'The Legal Problem in Transvestism' (n 68); JL Hampson, 'Deviant Sexual Behavior: 
Homosexuality; Transvestism' in CW Lloyd (ed), Human Reproduction and Sexual Behaviour 
(Henry Kimpton 1964) 508; Benjamin, 'Nature and Management of Transsexualism' (n 49) 110. 
For a modern account which appears to accept Sherwin’s argument, see D Rudacille, The Riddle of 
Gender: Science, Activism, and Transgender Rights (Pantheon Books 2005) 116. 
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Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment.79 At the very least, Sherwin’s concerted 
campaign appears to have created confusion about the applicability of mayhem 
statutes to castration. Doubts about legality still remained though, as exemplified 
by the answer given to a question asked by a doctor approached to perform GRS 
in 1962 in the Journal of the American Medical Association.80 The response from 
JAMA’s Legal Department informed the doctor that he risked being charged with 
mayhem and advised him to obtain a legal opinion from the state attorney 
general “or a court ruling as to whether or not the operations would constitute a 
violation of criminal law.”81  
Despite Sherwin’s efforts, the view that castration constituted maim or mayhem 
had a significant impact on medical practice, driving GRS underground or 
abroad. Alternatively, surgeons disguised castration as a more obviously 
therapeutic procedure, or avoided it by moving rather than removing the 
testicles. Key narratives influenced professional attitudes towards the lawfulness 
of GRS. In the next section I use two such linked narratives from the United 
Kingdom, and two separate narratives from the United States to illustrate these 
effects.  
                                                        
79 Money and Schwartz, 'Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism' (n 49) 258. 
80 See text accompanying n 37. 
81 Bergen, 'Questions and Answers: Transvestism Surgery' (n 37) 888. See also, N Lukianowicz, 
'Survey of Various Aspects of Transvestism in the Light of Our Present Knowledge' (1959) 128 
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 36, 57; J Dukeminier, Jr., 'Supplying Organs for 
Transplantation' (1970) 68 Michigan L Rev 811, 853; Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination 
and Alteration' (n 49) 183; Smith, 'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law' (n 
13) 989 (“The existence of a mayhem statute should not be considered an absolute bar to the 
operation, but it would be advisable to consult with the local district attorney or seek an advisory 
opinion of the state attorney general before performing sex reassignment surgery.”). 
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Narratives 1 and 2: Michael Dillon, Roberta Cowell and Harold Gillies 
In the United Kingdom, GRS divided legal opinion when it first came to legal 
attention in the 1950s and 1960s. The influential psychiatrist Narcyz 
Lukianowicz suggested in The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease that the fact 
that one such procedure had been performed in 1953 necessarily indicated its 
lawfulness.82 The procedure to which Lukianowicz referred formed part of a 
narrative involving Michael Dillon, Roberta Cowell and the country’s leading 
plastic and reconstructive surgeon, Harold Gillies.83 Gillies thought that any 
procedure which benefitted the patient was justified:  
My view of whether a cosmetic operation is justifiable is clear. If it is 
going to make a great difference to the patient in happiness, in social 
advancement, and particularly in a job, it is justified. If it gives real 
happiness, that is the most that any surgeon or medicine can give.84  
Dillon (who had been born female as Laura) was a patient of Gillies who had met 
Cowell (who had been born male as Robert) following the publication of Dillon’s 
book, Self: A study in ethics and endocrinology in 1946.85 In Self, written while 
Dillon was transitioning, he argued for GRS:  
there is, for these people, no recognized form of treatment other than 
that offered by the psychologists; for what the patient asks, namely, 
that his body be made to fit his mind, is refused him. This, according 
to the psychologists, would be mere mutilation and, since it leads to 
non-productivity, therefore useless … Surely, where the mind cannot 
be made to fit the body, the body should be made to fit, 
approximately, at any rate to the mind, despite the prejudices of those 
                                                        
82 Lukianowicz, 'Survey of Various Aspects of Transvestism in the Light of Our Present 
Knowledge' (n 81) 57. For evidence of Lukianowicz’s influence on medico-legal commentators, 
see Bowman and Engle, 'Sex Offenses: The Medical and Legal Implications of Sex Variations' (n 
78) 307; Smith, 'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law' (n 13) 989. For 
opinions to the contrary, see n 61. 
83 See R Battle, 'Gillies, Sir Harold Delf (1882–1960)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (rev 
edn, Oxford University Press 2004). For a theatrical glimpse of Gillies as a pioneer of 
reconstructive surgery during the First World War, see H Brenton, Doctor Scroggy's War (Nick 
Hern Books 2014). 
84 R Pound, Gillies, Surgeon Extraordinary: A Biography (M Joseph 1964) 123. 
85 Dillon, Self (n 39). 
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who have not suffered these things, yet to suffer which they so readily 
condemn others.86 
Cowell had been taking hormones for some time and wanted her genitalia 
altered to correspond with her “female outlook”.87 Although Gillies had been 
willing to help Dillon by providing surgery88 as he had done for other FTM 
transsexuals,89 he was not prepared to run the risk of prosecution for maim and 
perform castrations on MTF transsexuals like Cowell.90 Unable to find a doctor in 
England who would perform the castration, Cowell eventually convinced Dillon, 
now a medical student, to perform it, outside of a hospital, in secret.91  
                                                        
86 ibid 53. 
87 HD Gillies and DR Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (Little, Brown 1957) 385. 
88 Gillies described what he had done for Dillon in his textbook: 
he came for plastic consultation and after due consideration the case was 
undertaken. … The technical performances included the partial closing of the 
vaginal opening, the joining of the urethra to a new length of skin tube incorporated 
in a tube pedicle, and finally the insertion of cartilage in this new penis. It was 
presumed that any vaginal secretions that might arise would be voided down the 
urethra, as the junction between old and new urethrae was more by juxtaposition 
than suture. The clitoris, with its special nerve supply, was preserved and grafted at 
the dorsum of the penis near its root. A scrotum was constructed by a square flap 
from the pubic region including the mons pubis with its hair and fat. On bilateral 
pedicles it was lifted over the penis and suspended below to form the sac. 
Subsequently the pedicles were divided and draped more closely around the shaft 
of the penis. After minor initial difficulties no trouble has been experienced with 
urination. Provided thus with the new organ, the patient’s life has been a social 
success; he has become an active and successful business man and is very anxious 
to have everything done that would make it justifiable for him to marry. 
ibid 384. Dillon’s “surgery to change his gender (13 operations between 1946 and 1949) is 
considered the first of the modern era because of its surgical sophistication and its early use of 
testosterone.” M Roach, 'Girls Will Be Boys' New York Times (18 March 2007) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/books/review/Roach.t.html> accessed 15 August 
2013. 
89 L Hodgkinson, Michael, Née Laura (Columbus 1989), chapters 4 and 5. Caution was still 
exercised in such cases although the threat of prosecution was less acute. See text accompanying 
nn 129-131. 
90 P Kennedy, The First Man-Made Man: The Story of Two Sex Changes, One Love Affair, and a 
Twentieth-Century Medical Revolution (Bloomsbury Publishing 2008) 64.  
91 Cowell signed a waiver before Dillon performed the orchidectomy:  
I, R.C. have, of my own free will asked and persuaded L.M.D., who I am aware is an 
unqualified man, a 5th year medical student, to perform an orchidectomy upon me. 
I am also aware that his operating experience has been confined solely to assisting 
at operations as a resident pupil in hospital and to one appendectomy in the 
presence of a surgeon and that he has neither seen nor practiced this particular 
operation. I desire that he be absolved from all responsibility in this operation, due 
to possible hemorrhage or sepsis, which I am desirous to undergo being fully aware 
that either might, per fortunam, be fatal. 
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Once the MTF transsexual had undergone the orchidectomy, either outside the 
country or underground,92 like Cowell, British surgeons were willing to provide 
after-care including the construction of a vagina.93 Gillies (and his colleagues) 
undertook these procedures for Cowell, describing them in his textbook, The 
Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery.94 It appears that Gillies knew that his patient 
Dillon had performed the orchidectomy on his new patient Cowell. In his 
textbook, Gillies described Cowell’s testicles as “functionally embryonic” prior to 
their “removal abroad”, which permitted him to conclude that “it might be 
argued that had the castration been performed in Great Britain the law of 
mayhem in reference to mutilation would not have applied”, the underlying 
assumption being that had the testicles been healthy, their removal would have 
constituted maim.95 Of course much of this was false. Gillies was likely trying to 
protect both himself and Dillon from any possible prosecution for maim, both by 
disguising the location and identity of the “surgeon”, and by arguing that in any 
event the orchidectomy would not have constituted a maim even if performed in 
the UK. Cowell had not been castrated abroad, although many British and 
American transsexuals did travel to Mexico, 96  Morocco, 97  Japan, 98  the 
Netherlands,99  France,100  Italy,101  or Scandinavia102  for castration and other 
                                                                                                                                                              
R Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story by Herself (Hamilton & Co 1955); Kennedy, The First Man-Made 
Man (n 90) 91. 
92 Kennedy, The First Man-Made Man (n 90) 164-166. 
93 D King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual: Public Categories and Private Identities (Avebury 
1993) 54, describing surgeons who were willing to “finish[] off” but “not begin[] an irreversible 
process.”  
94 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 385-386. This is discussed in 
more detail in the text accompanying nn 144-145. 
95 ibid 386. The testicles had been preserved in section, presumably by Dillon. 
96 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 118. 
97 H Benjamin, 'Clinical Aspects of Transsexualism in the Male and Female' (1964) 18 American 
Journal of Psychotherapy 458, 465. April Ashley and Jan Morris both went to Casablanca. See 
Corbett v Corbett (n 17) 99; J Morris, Conundrum (Faber 1974). 
98 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 118. 
99 ibid; King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54. 
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surgical procedures. Cowell’s testicles were unlikely to have been “functionally 
embryonic” given that as a man, Robert Cowell had fathered two children and 
been a decorated fighter pilot who was physically examined before he was 
admitted into the Royal Air Force in 1941.103 While the testicles were atrophied, 
this was likely due to the hormones Cowell had been taking for years prior to the 
orchidectomy.104 Cowell’s was not the only case in which doctors falsified 
medical records and publications to protect those involved from the threat of 
prosecution. “[I]n some cases it seems that the phrase ‘castrated abroad’ was a 
euphemism used to hide the identity of the surgeon concerned.”105 
Narrative 3: Val Barry  
Harry Benjamin’s involvement in one particular potential surgical case had left 
him frustrated with the law of mayhem. In 1948, the Wisconsin state Attorney 
General’s office advised a hospital contemplating performing GRS including 
castration on a patient known as “Val Barry” that such an operation would 
constitute mayhem.106 In 1949 the then California Attorney General Edmund G. 
Brown provided similar advice to Benjamin in relation to the same patient.107 In 
reply, Benjamin wrote to Brown: 
                                                                                                                                                              
100 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 118. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid; J Meyerowitz, 'Sex Change and the Popular Press: Historical Notes on Transsexuality in 
the United States, 1930–1955' (1998) 4 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 159 (on 
Christine Jorgensen’s surgery in Denmark and Lynn (or Val) Barry’s surgery in Sweden). See also, 
Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) chapter 2. 
103 Kennedy, The First Man-Made Man (n 90) 56. 
104 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 385-386. 
105 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54. Many surgical interventions apparently 
went unrecorded or unreported. ibid 60. 
106 Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 47. See also, Meyerowitz, 'Sex Research at the Borders of 
Gender' (n 63) 79. This may be the same case described in Sherwin, 'Sex Crime—a Failure of the 
Law' (n 73) 117. See also, Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 142. 
107 Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 47. 
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it is difficult to reconcile my common sense with the fact that statutes 
based on the requirements of English kings in the middle ages should 
still be valid … I do not see how any surgeon anywhere in this country 
could possibly perform such operation.108 
Even the lawyer Robert Veit Sherwin accepted that the prevailing legal advice 
from prosecutors would be to the effect that castration constituted mayhem: 
there is hardly a district attorney in the country who would not 
inform a doctor that it would be illegal for the doctor to perform such 
an operation. When asked for proof of his statement, the District 
Attorney would point to the Mayhem Statute.109  
In addition to advice from prosecutors “throughout the country”,110 lawyers 
advised surgeons against operating.111 Although the advice given was not 
uniformly negative,112 “[Brown’s] opinion cast a pall, lasting for years, over 
efforts by U.S. transgender people to gain access to transsexual medical 
procedures in their own country.”113 
Narrative 4: Hedy Jo Starr 
As in the United Kingdom, the law of mayhem affected American medical 
practice. One transsexual, Hedy Jo Star, described her face being covered with a 
sheet while she was examined by specialists who wished to remain anonymous 
because the planned procedure “was illegal under New York law”. Although her 
surgeon was willing to proceed, and numerous specialists approved,  
                                                        
108 ibid 35. See also, Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 142. 
109 Sherwin, 'The Legal Problem in Transvestism' (n 68) 243-244. Along similar lines, see 
Sherwin, 'Sex Crime—a Failure of the Law' (n 73) 117-118. 
110 JG Raymond, The Transsexual Empire (Women's Press 1980) 40. 
111 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 47. “Benjamin’s friend Max Thorek, a 
renowned surgeon in Chicago, initially sympathetic, refused, on his lawyer’s advice, to operate [on 
Val Barry].” Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 48 [emphasis added] and see also at 121 
(advice from law professor based on legal “uncertainty”).  
112 By 1962, a later attorney general of California (Stanley Mosk) advised another doctor (Robert 
Stoller) that “we have not, to my knowledge, ever contended that such an operation with sound 
medical justification and the consent of the transvestite, is illegal.” Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed 
(n 38) 121. See also, RJ Stoller, 'A Biased View of 'Sex Transformation' Operations: An Editorial' 
(1969) 149 The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 312, 314. 
113 S Stryker, Transgender History (Seal Press 2008) 45. 
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the New York State Medical Society refused to grant permission for 
the surgery … The decision of the society was based not on medical or 
scientific criteria, but on a fear of legal action. In New York State, as in 
almost every other civic jurisdiction in the United States, it was illegal 
to surgically remove a man’s testicles.114 
In Baltimore at Johns Hopkins, the doctors were also unwilling to perform the 
surgery for fear of the Maryland mayhem statute, writing to Star in 1959 that 
“there are numerous reasons from both your standpoint and from the standpoint 
of the surgeons involved that would suggest that the performance of this type of 
surgery might in actuality constitute mayhem …”115 
Alternatively, surgeons responded to the law of mayhem by modifying the 
surgical procedure so that it could no longer be described as castrative. Thus 
doubts about the legality of castration also influenced how surgical 
reassignments were performed. In his 1964 book The Transsexual Phenomenon, 
Benjamin observed that some surgeons would preserve the testicles invisibly, in 
order to avoid being “accused of a (possibly illegal) castration operation.”116 
Elmer Belt, a California urologist who performed most of the procedures that 
took place in the United States in the 1950s117 “thought it medically best to 
preserve the testicles and the hormones they produced,118 and thereby managed 
to avoid whatever legal liability castration might potentially involve.”119 This 
practice also occurred in the United Kingdom.120 The leading British surgeon 
                                                        
114 Rudacille, The Riddle of Gender (n 78) 116. 
115 ibid 117, quoting from HJ Star, My Unique Change (Novel Books, Incorporated 1965). Further 
legal and medical developments at Johns Hopkins are discussed in the text accompanying nn 190, 
192-195. 
116 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 101. 
117 Stryker, Transgender History (n 113) 45. 
118 Benjamin cited this as another reason for retaining the testicles, “based on the theory that the 
testes in transsexual men may produce more estrogen than they do normally ... although they 
have as yet found no confirmation.” Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 100. 
119 “Belt used a procedure in which he preserved the testicles, pushing them through the inguinal 
ring out of the scrotum and into the abdomen.” Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 146.  
120 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54. 
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John Randell described this procedure as a “redistribution operation … devised 
to avoid legal difficulties and the charge of mayhem.”121 
The impact of castration as maim or mayhem on the clinical practice of GRS 
The view that castration constituted maim or mayhem, coupled with the failure 
to recognise that the medical exception might nonetheless be applicable to 
castration in the context of GRS resulted in a reluctance to perform it openly. 
Doctors restricted themselves to after-care or re-sited rather than removed the 
testicles. They employed subterfuge and concealment to avoid the label of GRS 
by ostensibly performing a procedure covered by the patient-focused public 
policy justification. The criminal law of maim or mayhem thereby shaped the 
clinical practice of GRS.  
Interpreting the medical exception for GRS 
Doubts over the lawfulness of GRS were not however restricted to the threat of 
maim or mayhem associated with castration. More broadly, the applicability of 
the medical exception to any of the procedures involved in GRS was in doubt. In 
the next three sections, I examine further the role of the criminal law in shaping 
GRS through the prism of the three versions of the public policy justification 
focused on the patient, the medical profession and the public. 
                                                        
121 J Randell, 'Preoperative and Postoperative Status of Male and Female Transsexuals' in R Green 
and J Money (eds), Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment (The Johns Hopkins University Press 
1969) 371. 
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Patient-focused public policy justification 
In his oft-cited article Psychopathia Transexualis, the psychiatrist David O. 
Cauldwell recounted his response to an early request from a FTM transsexual for 
GRS: 
it would be criminal for any surgeon to mutilate a pair of healthy 
breasts and it would be just as criminal for a surgeon to castrate a 
woman with no disease of the ovaries or related glands and without 
any condition wherein castration might be beneficial.122 
Many other doctors also described such operations as “mutilating”123 and agreed 
that they should not be undertaken.124 Indeed Michael Dillon had echoed this 
language in his book Self, arguing in favour of patient autonomy: “Is it not for the 
individual to judge whether he should be ‘mutilated,’ experimented on or left 
alone?”125 The very issue of whether the procedure caused a net harm was in 
dispute, meaning that the most common version of the medical exception’s 
public policy justification that focused on the patient might not be available.  
Commentators argued that the patient-focused public policy justification was 
absent, on the grounds that any psychological benefit to the patient was 
outweighed by physical harm.126 The legal commentator David Meyers described 
                                                        
122 DO Cauldwell, 'Psychopathia Transexualis' (1949) 16 Sexology 274, 278. 
123 A Correspondent, 'Sexual Deviation' (1960) 276 The Lancet 922. See also, DO Cauldwell, Sex 
Transmutation—Can One's Sex Be Changed?: There's but a Thin Line between the Sexes, but the 
Would-Be Sex Transmutee Battles Forces More Stubborn Than the Genes (Haldeman-Julius 
Publications 1951) 19, reprinted as DO Cauldwell, 'Sex Transmutation – Can One's Sex Be 
Changed? There's but a Thin Genetic Line between the Sexes, but the Would-Be Sex Transmutee 
Battles Forces More Stubborn Than the Genes' (2001) 5 International Journal of Transgenderism; 
KL Moore and CHC Edwards, 'Medico-Legal Aspects of Intersexuality: Criteria of Sex: Part I' 
(1960) 83 Canadian Medical Association Journal 709, 713; CW Socarides, 'The Desire for Sexual 
Transformation: A Psychiatric Evaluation of Transsexualism' (1969) 125 The American Journal 
of Psychiatry 1419, 1424; Dillon, Self (n 39) 53; Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of 
Plastic Surgery (n 87) 386. 
124 Editorial, 'Change of Sex' (1954) 1 BMJ 694; C Allen, 'Change of Sex' (1954) 1 BMJ 1040. 
125 Dillon, Self (n 39) 55. 
126 TB Smith, 'Law, Professional Ethics and the Human Body' (1959) Scots Law Times (News) 
245, 247; James, 'Legal Issues of Transsexualism in England' (n 29) 449 (“Orchidectomy or 
mastectomy could be safely performed if for therapeutic purposes; but this would scarcely cover 
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GRS as “a severe and ‘unlawful’ physical invasion … deemed harmful to the ill-
fated transsexual.”127 Doctors attempted to bring GRS within the patient-focused 
public policy justification by manipulating diagnoses, expanding the role of after-
care, and focusing on the risk of harm to the patient if GRS were not provided. 
Alternative diagnoses 
As we have already seen for orchidectomy,128 doctors manipulated diagnoses so 
that procedures appeared more obviously therapeutic. For Dillon, for example, 
Gillies originally used a diagnosis of acute hypospadias,129 so that in his medical 
records Dillon appeared to be a man who required “a cosmetic repair of his 
penis.”130 One British surgeon performed hysterectomies on FTM transsexuals 
on the grounds that “if it is not going to be used, you might as well remove a 
potentially cancer-bearing organ.”131 
Doctors also used deliberately vague or misleading terms in hospital records in 
order to disguise the nature of the operations. Thus the condition of an MTF 
transsexual might be described vaguely as “genitalia” or more specifically (and 
truthfully if misleadingly) “congenital absence of vagina”.132 Gillies applied the 
                                                                                                                                                              
cases involving change-of-sex operations in England at the present time”). A similar position was 
taken in 1971 by the New York State Board of Health which was of the view that “surgery for the 
transsexual is an experimental form of psychotherapy by which mutilating surgery is conducted 
on a person with the intent of setting hi[s] mind at ease”. By refusing to permit the transsexual’s 
new sex to be entered on his new birth certificate, the Board hoped to discourage GRS. Hartin v 
Director of Bureau of Records 347 NYS2d 515, 518 (1973, Supr Ct). 
127 Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (n 68) 54. 
128 See text accompanying n 95. 
129 A birth defect of the urethra in which the opening is abnormally placed.  
130 Kennedy, The First Man-Made Man (n 90) 71. A real case of hypospadias is found in Gillies and 
Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 371-372. 
131 J Randell, 'Indications for Sex Reassignment Surgery' (1971) 1 Archives of Sexual Behavior 
153, 161. Interestingly, Dillon did not have a hysterectomy, perhaps because no gynaecological 
surgeon could be found willing to perform the procedure. Hodgkinson, Michael, Née Laura (n 89) 
93. 
132 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54.  
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latter phrase to Roberta Cowell,133 and also used “congenital absence of the penis 
with male outlook” for FTM surgeries, possibly including Michael Dillon.134 
Some clinicians suggested that the category of “intersex” diagnoses, for which 
surgery including castration135 was recognised as therapeutic and “good medical 
practice”—using the patient-focused and professionally-focused public policy 
justifications respectively—should be extended to include those seeking sex 
reassignment.136 Patients (including Roberta Cowell)137 also claimed to have 
been born with an intersex condition in order to convince their doctors that GRS 
was therapeutically indicated.138 
Expanded role of “after-care” 
The undertaking of surgical after-care following self-castration,139 initial surgery 
abroad 140  or underground 141  is a relatively well-known feature of the 
                                                        
133 Roberta Cowell herself wrote that “[Gillies] told me that the operation for congenital absence 
of vagina was completed.” Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story by Herself (n 91) 106. 
134 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 371; Hausman, Changing 
Sex (n 42) 207. 
135 E Reis, Bodies in Doubt: An American History of Intersex (Johns Hopkins University Press 2009) 
48, 69, 77-78, 103, 112, 194. 
136 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 370-371, discussed in King, 
The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54-55; BL Hausman, 'Body, Technology, and Gender 
in Transsexual Autobiography' in S Stryker and S Whittle (eds), The Transgender Studies Reader 
(Routledge 2006) 342-344. See also, AP Cawadias, 'Change of Sex' (1954) 1 BMJ 876. See contra, 
Allen, 'Change of Sex' (n 124); Moore and Edwards, 'Medico-Legal Aspects of Intersexuality: 
Criteria of Sex: Part I' (n 123) 713;  Forbes-Sempill  (29 December 1967, Court of Session Outer 
House (Scotland)) (dispute over hereditary baronetcy resolved in favor of “hermaphrodite” who 
had had his birth records corrected). (Though commentators agree that Ewan Forbes-Sempill 
was a transsexual. See, eg, L-A Barnes, 'Gender Identity and Scottish Law: The Legal Response to 
Transsexuality' (2007) 11 Edinburgh L Rev 162.) 
137 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story by Herself (n 91), discussed in Kennedy, The First Man-Made 
Man (n 90) 56. 
138 Reis, Bodies in Doubt (n 135) 203, n 98. An example is described in Hausman, Changing Sex (n 
42) 1-2. 
139 For example, the case of Caren Ecker described in Bowman and Engle, 'Medicolegal Aspects of 
Transvestism' (n 78) 587 and Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 145. Penotomy was 
performed after self-castration, in part due to fears that the patient “might again try self-
emasculation and harm himself more seriously.” Bowman and Engle, 'Medicolegal Aspects of 
Transvestism' (n 78) 587. 
140 See King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54 (“most patients … went to Holland or 
France to be castrated, returning to Britain for plastic surgery”). For other surgical destinations, 
Penney Lewis, ‘The lawfulness of gender reassignment surgery’, American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 57, 2017 (forthcoming) 
 28 
development of GRS. In 1968, Robert J. Stoller, a leading gender researcher 
observed: 
Almost no such procedures have been performed in the last few years 
in major American medical centers (with the exception of patients 
who had already gotten parts of the operation done somewhere else, 
or where the patient had already mutilated himself).142 
Less well-known is the way in which the medical profession expanded and 
manipulated after-care to avoid the risk of prosecution or the appearance of 
unlawful surgery. Hormone treatment could be provided to a physically normal 
patient, resulting in changes to genitalia and secondary sexual characteristics 
which themselves could then be used to justify surgery on an “intersex” or 
otherwise “abnormal” patient.143 Harold Gillies’ discussion of Roberta Cowell’s 
“functionally embryonic” testicles provides an example of this approach.144 An 
excerpt from the uro-genital consultant’s report on Cowell stated: 
I feel that orchidectomy and hormone treatment have had such a 
marked effect on this patient that there now seems to be no 
alternative but to assist the completion of the metamorphosis. Apart 
from all the other circumstances and clinical facts, I feel justified in 
my opinion that the patient is now more female than male, by finding 
that both the prostate and seminal vesicles are practically non-
existent. I am content that no active seminal secretion is being 
manufactured and that any prostatic tissue which may still exist is 
negligible. Therefore, considering all the circumstances, I think there 
is justification for operative treatment to assist metamorphosis, in 
                                                                                                                                                              
see text accompanying nn 96-102. For examples of the after-care of individual patients, see 
Morris, Conundrum (n 97) 127; Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 145-146 (Annette Dolan). 
141 See Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (n 43) 467 (drawing an analogy 
with after-care following backstreet abortion). For example, see the discussion of the after-care 
provided to Roberta Cowell, in the text accompanying nn 92-94, and Charlotte McLeod, described 
in Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 82. On “underground practitioners in the United States” 
in the 1950s, see also, ibid 150. 
142 RJ Stoller, Sex and Gender: On the Development of Masculinity and Femininity (Science House 
1968) 250. 
143 On the use of the intersex diagnosis to justify GRS using the patient-focused public policy 
justification, see the text accompanying nn 135-138. 
144 See nn 94, 103-104 and accompanying text.  
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spite of the vaguely possible danger that in 10 years or more the 
patient’s female feelings may again change to the opposite sex.145 
In the United Kingdom, King describes an interesting strategy used for a short 
period in the 1950s, with both medical and legal characteristics: 
In some early cases after hormone treatment, the legal sex was 
changed146 thus enabling plastic surgery to be justified as corrective. 
One doctor explained to the press that in [Roberta] Cowell’s case the 
amended birth certificate was “in the nature of a working certificate 
to enable the plastic surgeons to carry out their operations” (Sunday 
Pictorial, March 14th, 1954). After [publicity surrounding] the Cowell 
case this ceased to be possible although it was still seen as desirable 
and attempts were still made to gain the approval of Somerset House 
[which then housed the General Register Office].147 After a while the 
surgeons involved decided a legal change of name would be sufficient 
(interview).148 
Psychological benefit and avoidance of harm 
Alternative attempts to justify the procedures focused on emphasising the 
psychological benefits to the patient from surgery,149 and/or the risk of harm 
associated with non-provision. As is already evident from some of the after-care 
cases,150 this was not a theoretical risk; cases of suicide151 and self-harm152 did 
                                                        
145 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 386. Gillies also described 
Dillon pre-operatively as having a “large clitoris and diminutive vagina”, probably the result of 
hormone therapy. ibid 383. 
146 This was apparently then easy to do even prior to surgery, although only a small number of 
such cases are known. See Kennedy, The First Man-Made Man (n 90) 52, 87; Hamburger, Sturup 
and Dahl-Iversen, 'Transvestism; Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical Treatment' (n 43) 393 (two 
British MTF transsexuals were “legally registered” as women “despite the presence of normal 
male genitals.”) 
147 See, eg, Pound, Gillies, Surgeon Extraordinary (n 90) 244 for an example of such an attempt. 
Having changed her name to April Ashley by deed poll, the MTF transsexual in Corbett v Corbett 
also attempted unsuccessfully to change her legal sex after her surgery in Morocco ((n 17) 93). 
148 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 53-54. 
149 Walker and Fletcher, Sex and Society (n 48) 199; Pound, Gillies, Surgeon Extraordinary (n 90) 
123; Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (n 43) 468-469.  
150 See n 139. 
151 P Riis, ‘Discussion’ following the chapter by Armstrong, 'Transvestism' (n 49) 91; Benjamin, 
The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 48. 
152 Hamburger, Sturup and Dahl-Iversen, 'Transvestism; Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical 
Treatment' (n 43) 392; AH Esman, 'A Case of Self-Castration' (1954) 120 Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease 79 (self-castration with a razor; patient wanted to be a girl); SE Cleveland, 'Three 
Cases of Self-Castration' (1956) 123 Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease 386 (first patient 
wanted to be a girl; third attempt successful using self-constructed clamp to prevent bleeding); 
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occur and are described in the literature. In a review of 100 MTF cases in 1965, 
Pauly found that 18 had attempted castration, with 9 succeeding.153 In The 
Transsexual Phenomenon, Benjamin commented: 
Sometimes these acts of self-mutilation are done in desperation. 
Others are more deliberate and are meant to force the surgeon’s hand 
to complete the genital alteration which he had refused to undertake 
for reasons of his ethical concepts, or for lack of hospital facilities 
(where the necessary permission was withheld by the hospital 
board), for fear of criticism or out of consideration of existing laws.154 
American judges used the risks of suicide and self-harm to support a patient-
focused public policy justification. In the 1977 Georgia case Rush v. Parham, the 
patient challenged the state’s denial of funding for GRS from their medicaid plan 
(for those with a low income). The trial court endorsed the evidence of the 
patient’s psychiatrist on a motion for summary judgment: 
The diagnosis in this case is definitely that of transsexualism. She has 
made a mature decision in regard to sex reassignment surgery. I feel 
that such surgery is urgently indicated because of the feelings of 
despair and frustration which she has had in regard to her condition. 
There is no approach other than surgery which can alleviate her 
depression and remove the threat of suicide.155 
Although the appeal court returned the trial court’s decision in favour of the 
patient for a full hearing, the California Court of Appeals subsequently cited this 
                                                                                                                                                              
KH Blacker and N Wong, 'Four Cases of Autocastration' (1963) 8 Archives of General Psychiatry 
169; Walker and Fletcher, Sex and Society (n 48) 199 (transsexual attacked a testicle with a 
scissors, resulting in a need for surgical castration due to the irreparable damage to the testicle); 
DP van Kammen and J Money, 'Erotic Imagery and Self-Castration in 
Transvestism/Transsexualism' (1977) 2 Journal of Homosexuality 359, 360-361 (use of a farm 
castration tool); D Green, 'Legal Aspects of Transsexualism' (1971) 1 Archives of Sexual Behavior 
145, 148 (patient asked a prostitute to remove his sex organs with a razor); E de Savitsch, 
Homosexuality, Transvestism, and Change of Sex (William Heinemann Medical Books Ltd. 1958) 
51, 55-56, 73, 80, 83 (removal of penis with an axe; use of a string as a tourniquet); Benjamin, 
'Transvestism and Transsexualism' (n 63) 13; Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex 
Operation' (n 43) 467. Meyerowitz describes two cases of self-castration, one in which the 
patient “almost bled to death” (Caren Ecker, discussed at n 139, and another which was 
successful, the patient having “studied the surgical procedure step by step and memorized its 
sequence” beforehand. Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 145-146. 
153 IB Pauly, 'Male Psychosexual Inversion: Transsexualism: A Review of 100 Cases' (1965) 13 
Archives of General Psychiatry 172, 177. 
154 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 47-48. 
155 Rush v Parham 440 FSupp 383, 386 (1977, ND Ga), reversed by Rush v Parham 625 F2d 1150 
(1980, 5th Cir). 
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quotation with approval in a similar 1978 case. In G.B. v. Lackner, the patient 
sought funding for GRS from the state medicaid program for those with a low 
income (Medi-Cal). 156  The patient’s expert psychologist and her treating 
physician also mentioned the risks of suicide and self-harm.157  
Legal and medical commentators in the US,158 UK,159 Canada160 and beyond161 
also used the risks of suicide and self-harm. David Meyers described a consensus 
that these “wider, rather atypical therapeutic grounds” were sufficient to provide 
a patient-focused public policy justification.162 The leading British medical law 
academic Ian Kennedy went further, arguing that the risk of self-harm by the 
patient was a necessary condition of legality; GRS  would only be lawful if expert 
medical opinion could demonstrate “at least some risk of harm to the patient if 
surgery is not performed.”163 John Randell, the surgeon who carried out many 
                                                        
156 GB v Lackner 80 Cal App 3d 64, 67-68 (1978). 
157 ibid 67, 68. 
158 H Guze, 'The Transsexual Patient: A Problem in Self-Perception' (1967) 29 Transactions of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 464, 466; Money and Schwartz, 'Public Opinion and Social Issues 
in Transsexualism' (n 49) 267-268 which reproduces the Press Release of 21 November 1966 
entitled “On the establishment of a clinic for transsexuals at the Johns Hopkins Medical 
Institutions”. The Press Release quoted Dr. John E. Hoopes, chairman of the Gender Identity 
Clinic: “The high incidence of suicide and self-mutilation among these people testifies to the 
magnitude of the problem. If the mind cannot be changed to fit the body, then perhaps we should 
consider changing the body to fit the mind.” This quotation appeared in GB v Lackner (n 156) 68. 
The establishment of the Gender Identity Clinic at Johns Hopkins is discussed in the text 
accompanying nn 192-195. 
159 Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (n 49) 174, 185-186; Meyers, The 
Human Body and the Law (n 68) 66-67; King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54-55. 
160  Edwards, 'Recent Developments Concerning the Criteria of Sex and Possible Legal 
Implications' (n 65) 126; Moore and Edwards, 'Medico-Legal Aspects of Intersexuality: Criteria of 
Sex: Part II' (n 65) 759. Approved by Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (n 33) 65, 
72-73. Meyers subsequently based the entirety of his analysis of the legality of GRS in Canada on 
Edwards’ views. Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (n 49) 181; Meyers, The 
Human Body and the Law (n 68) 59-60. See also, Smith, 'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment 
Surgery and the Law' (n 13) 985. 
161 SA Strauss, 'The Sex Change Operation: Two Interesting Decisions' (1967) 84 South African LJ 
214, 216; Hamburger, Sturup and Dahl-Iversen, 'Transvestism; Hormonal, Psychiatric, and 
Surgical Treatment' (n 43) 392; de Savitsch, Homosexuality, Transvestism, and Change of Sex (n 
152) 51, 70, 71, 76. 
162 Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (n 68) 66-67. Meyers had made a similar claim two 
years earlier in 1968: , 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (n 49) 185. 
163 IM Kennedy, 'Transsexualism and Single Sex Marriage' (1973) 2 Anglo-American L Rev 112, 
117-118. 
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gender reassignment procedures at Charing Cross Hospital in London had 
received legal advice to this effect:  
I have been advised by a solicitor of one of the defense organizations 
that it is not enough to operate on a patient to make it more 
comfortable for him to live in the world in the female gender role, or 
vice versa. There must be some medical indication, as in the case of 
the proposed abortion, preferably signed by two psychiatrists, to the 
effect that this operation is necessary to preserve the mental health 
and to prevent deterioration to a serious degree of the mental stability 
of the patient in question. And I think that one can say this of a large 
number of our patients.164 
In one New York case, the court also used the absence of a risk of suicide or self-
harm to determine that GRS was not medically necessary—although the legality 
of GRS was not directly in issue. In Denise R. v. Lavine, the state court upheld an 
administrative decision denying funding for GRS to a patient on the grounds that 
“there was no disturbance in thinking or suicidal inclination”.165 
Professionally-focused public policy justification 
Most commentators described the absence of a professional consensus needed to 
support a professionally-focused public policy justification.166 In 1973, the US 
Department of Health Education and Welfare concluded that:  
Transexualism has not at this time reached the status of a generally 
accepted, clearly defined diagnostic entity. Even if such an entity 
could be established, reconstructive surgery (to make body changes 
in keeping with gender of choice) has not reached the status of a 
                                                        
164 Randell, 'Indications for Sex Reassignment Surgery' (n 131) 160 [emphasis added]. This legal 
advice was based on the abortion case Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 (Central Criminal Court). 
165 Denise R v Lavine 39 NY2d 279, 282-283 (1976, CA). This was the view of one medical expert, 
which had been preferred over the evidence of another expert who had testified that the 
procedure “was a matter of life and death”. 
166 See text accompanying n 43, and see also, R Green, RJ Stoller and C MacAndrew, 'Attitudes 
toward Sex Transformation Procedures' (1966) 15 Archives of General Psychiatry 178, 178-182; 
Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (n 43) 466-467; James, 'Legal Issues of 
Transsexualism in England' (n 29) 449; Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (n 68) 67; Smith, 
'Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law' (n 13) 973, 974; PJ Thomas, 'Can the 
Lawyer Keep up with the Doctor?' (1980) 97 South African LJ 77, 80; Randell, 'Indications for Sex 
Reassignment Surgery' (n 131) 154. 
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professionally accepted or recognized modality of treatment to be 
routinely utilized, although such surgery is provided at a number of 
medical centers on a research basis.167 
As late as 1983, the US District Court held in Rush v. Johnson that “[t]he evidence 
demonstrates that [GRS] is neither generally accepted [by the professional 
medical community] as a proven and effective treatment nor is there 
authoritative evidence that the surgery is safe and effective.”168 Historians 
including King, Meyerowitz, Reis and Rudacille have agreed that no professional 
consensus existed.169  
Despite its role in the development of a patient-focused public policy 
justification, even the risk of suicide and self-harm failed to create a professional 
consensus.170 “Many physicians preferred to see the patient in extremis rather 
than permit treatment.”171 In their survey of the attitudes of US physicians, 
Richard Green, Robert J. Stoller, and Craig MacAndrew noted that a majority of 
respondents felt that a patient’s “almost certain[] suicide should sex 
reassignment be denied … should not influence their decision opposing sex 
reassignment.”172 Thus the public policy justification was not professionally-
focused. The absence of professional consensus had overlapping explanations, 
                                                        
167 US Department of Health Education and Welfare decision, communicated in a personal letter 
dated September 1973, from an associate regional commissioner for Region I (centered in 
Boston) to the associate commissioner of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, quoted in ES 
David, 'The Law and Transsexualism' (1975) 7 Connecticut L Rev 288, 333-334 [emphasis 
added].  
168 Rush v Johnson 565 FSupp 856, 868 (1983, Dist Ct, ND Ga, Atlanta Division). 
169 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 54; Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 
273; Reis, Bodies in Doubt (n 135) 145; Rudacille, The Riddle of Gender (n 78) 123-140. 
170 Although at least one commentator considered it to be a future possibility. Meyers, The 
Human Body and the Law (n 68) 54. 
171 E Crovitz, 'Treatment of the Transsexual and Medicolegal Issues' (1976) 7 Forensic Science 1, 
4. 
172 Green, Stoller and MacAndrew, 'Attitudes toward Sex Transformation Procedures' (n 166) 
180 (“The probability of the patient’s suicide should his request be denied raised the percentages 
of physicians approving the request only slightly; the majority of psychiatrists, 54%, felt that this 
should not in any way influence the decision.”); Green, 'Attitudes toward Transsexualism and 
Sex-Reassignment Procedures' (n 49) 238. 
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including professional distaste for moral173 or religious174 reasons, and doubts 
about the legality of procedures including castration. 
Public-focused public policy justification 
Given the public controversy over early cases,175 it is unsurprising that few 
doctors or lawyers tried to find a public-focused public policy justification for 
GRS. The medical profession avoided public attention and debate for the reasons 
already mentioned, including their doubts about legality and professional 
distaste. There was no third-party beneficiary or obvious societal benefit of the 
controversial procedures. Commentators generally avoided this form of 
justification, and the few attempts to use it were unconvincing. For example, 
Thomas James wondered whether “perhaps an overriding social necessity” 
might be found in some GRS cases,  “as in the case of castration of the so-called 
sexual psychopath …, sexual deviants, and morons”.176 One could also infer a 
rejection of the public-focused public policy justification in the writings of those 
who argued that the legitimation of these surgical procedures would harm 
society: 
                                                        
173 “Those involved were aware that their work in this area was regarded with some distaste by 
their fellow professionals who in the words of one surgeon, ‘thought we were just dealing with 
homosexuals and perverts’”. King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 53. See also, 
Bishop (n 49) 90; Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (n 49) 186; 
Meyerowitz, 'Sex Research at the Borders of Gender' (n 63) 85. 
174 Gillies and Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (n 87) 371; Benjamin, The 
Transsexual Phenomenon (n 49) 142; Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' 
(n 43) 467; Crovitz, 'Treatment of the Transsexual and Medicolegal Issues' (n 171) 4. In William 
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(ed), The Transsexual Phenomenon (Julian Press 1966) 54. 
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It is one thing to make life in society easier for those who exhibit the 
intersex conditions of Hermaphroditism or Pseudo-hermaphroditism, 
and quite another to leave a possible loophole for those suffering 
from sexual aberrations or deviations, such as certain trans-sexuals, 
who may have the strongest motives or drives to pass, legally or 
illegally, from one side of the sexual spectrum to, the other, and who, 
In the event of success In achieving the social sex of their desire, 
might bring disastrous consequences not only upon themselves but 
upon other [sic] in the society in which they live.177 
The shift towards legality 
A period of legal uncertainty followed on from the earlier consensus that GRS 
was unlawful. During this period professional confidence in the lawfulness of 
GRS grew as clinicians used the tactics previously outlined to bring GRS within 
the patient-focused public policy justification. The legal implications of changing 
gender brought the law into contact with patients who had already undergone 
GRS, opening the door to indirect judgments of its lawfulness. 
Consensus that GRS unlawful 
Until the early 1960s, the medical and legal professions and even the wider 
public regarded GRS—including but not limited to castration—as unlawful. 
Robert Veit Sherwin noted “the popular conception that everything connected 
with this subject is illegal in this country [the USA].”178 Demand for GRS was 
low179 and there was considerable reluctance to undertake it.180 Those doctors 
who were involved in GRS made extensive efforts to keep the procedures quiet 
                                                        
177 Forbes-Sempill (n 136) 18. For a more modern version of this argument, see Twardy, 
'Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism' (n 22) 295. 
178 Sherwin, 'The Legal Problem in Transvestism' (n 68) 243. 
179  Benjamin, 'Transsexualism and Transvestism as Psychosomatic and Somatopsychic 
Syndromes' (n 63) 229. Benjamin observed that “[a] conversion-operation is an infrequent 
procedure, even allowing for the fact that it may often be kept a deep secret (as a supposedly 
illegal procedure).” See also, Meyers, 'Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration' (n 49) 176, 
and the description by Hedy Jo Star in the text accompanying n 114. 
180 MM Belli, 'Transsexual Surgery: A New Tort?' (1978) 239 JAMA 2143. 
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and themselves relatively anonymous,181 at least in part because of the fear of 
legal repercussions. In the United Kingdom, “those who continued to operate on 
transvestites (some discontinued their involvement) felt themselves to be 
‘tainted’ by this involvement operating surreptitiously or at least without 
publicity or professional report”.182 Stryker observes that “In the 1950s, only a 
few dozen “sex change” operations were performed in the United States, most of 
them by Los Angeles urologist Elmer Belt (a friend of Benjamin’s), under 
conditions of secrecy.”183 
The need for legal intervention to change the patient’s gender status after the 
surgical procedures had taken place increased the risk of exposure. This 
prevented GRS from remaining completely within the private sphere. The 
isolation caused by low demand and secrecy, coupled with the risk of exposure 
increased the fear of prosecution.  
 Most scholars agree that the doubts about the legality of GRS had a significant 
impact on medical practice. In the American context, Deborah Rudacille argues 
that “[i]n the fifties and early sixties, mayhem statutes were the single greatest 
obstacle faced by every transsexual person in America unable to travel overseas 
for surgery or locate one of the few surgeons willing to flout the law by 
performing surgery in the United States.”184 Susan Stryker agrees that the fear of 
prosecution played a significant role in professional reluctance to perform 
surgery, placing particular emphasis on “California Attorney General Pat Brown’s 
                                                        
181 In the United Kingdom, see the discussion of the procedures Gillies undertook for Cowell after 
the orchidectomy in Pound, Gillies, Surgeon Extraordinary (n 90) 204.  
182 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 53. 
183 Stryker, Transgender History (n 113) 45 [emphasis added]. 
184 Rudacille, The Riddle of Gender (n 78) 115.  
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legal opinion against genital modification [which] created legal exposure for 
doctors who performed genital surgery.”185 
Joanne Meyerowitz dissents, downplaying the effect of doubts about lawfulness: 
legality and the ethics of removing healthy organs were not the sole 
or even the primary obstacles to sex-change surgery. The few 
American doctors who occasionally performed surgery on 
transsexuals suffered no legal penalty. No one was prosecuted for 
sex-change surgery under the mayhem statutes or any other laws.186   
However, Meyerowitz’s analysis underestimates the impact of the threat of 
prosecution. The prima facie applicability of the criminal offence of maim or 
mayhem to castration (despite Sherwin’s argument to the contrary) undoubtedly 
gave the threat of prosecution substance, as did the involvement of leading 
prosecutors. As we have seen, the threat of prosecution inhibited doctors from 
proceeding,187 and even affected the kinds of procedures performed.188 The little 
empirical evidence that exists bears out this effect. A survey of psychiatrists 
undertaken in the mid-1960s revealed that “64 percent [of 168 psychiatrists] 
were concerned over the legal implications” of GRS.189  
A period of legal uncertainty 
Surgeons began offering GRS at specialist clinics in Minnesota (at the University 
of Minnesota) and Maryland (at Johns Hopkins) in 1966.190 For different reasons, 
                                                        
185 Stryker, Transgender History (n 113) 73. 
186 Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed (n 38) 121. See also, JC Finney, 'Transsexuality and the Laws on 
Sexual Mores' in DR Laub and P Gandy (eds), Proceedings of the Second Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on Gender Dysphoria Syndrome (Division of Reconstructive and Rehabilitation 
Surgery, Stanford University Medical Center 1974). 
187 See n 49 and accompanying text.  
188 See text accompanying nn 116-119. 
189  R Green, 'Physician Emotionalism in the Treatment of the Transsexual' (1967) 29 
Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences 440, 441. See also, Green, Stoller and 
MacAndrew, 'Attitudes toward Sex Transformation Procedures' (n 172). 
190 Tierney and O'Brien, 'You're a Good Man Charlotte Brown or What Now My Love?' (n 49) 4. 
On Johns Hopkins, see the Press Release of 21 November 1966 (n 158), and T Buckley, 'A 
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the threat of prosecution was attenuated in both Minnesota and Baltimore 
(where Johns Hopkins is located). By 1966, Minnesota no longer had a mayhem 
statute. This “absence … was regarded as pivotal by the attorneys who studied 
the matter” and provided advice to the psychiatrists seeking to provide GRS to an 
MTF transsexual patient.191  
Maryland did have a mayhem statute; indeed fear of prosecution for mayhem 
had caused the doctors at Johns Hopkins to refuse to operate on Hedy Jo Star in 
1959.192 However, five years later an unusual case in Baltimore had reassured 
those doctors. G.L., a teenage boy with a history of arrests for stealing items of 
female clothing and accessories had been diagnosed as a transsexual during the 
psychiatric examinations conducted within the forensic process. He had 
requested GRS in 1964. Based on the recommendation of the psychiatrists and 
G.L.’s probation officer, the juvenile court judge issued a court order authorizing 
the surgery:  
When the case of G.L. arose, the specialists involved in the case, 
confident of the strength and accuracy of the medical decision about 
sex reassignment for G.L., did not embark upon the procedure of 
asking the law what should be done. Rather, events proceeded in such 
a way that the probation officer, the judge, and the two specialists at 
The Johns Hopkins Hospital coalesced their efforts to form a liaison 
between medicine and the law in the event that elective surgical 
conversion should be challenged in the future. The judge signed a 
court order for the surgical procedure. This court order would set no 
precedent unless challenged by a higher court. Nevertheless, the very 
act of signing a court order placed the procedure within the purview 
of the law.193 
                                                                                                                                                              
Changing of Sex by Surgery Begins at Johns Hopkins' New York Times (21 November 1966) 1, 32. 
It was an approach by Buckley that prompted the Johns Hopkins clinic to prepare the Press 
Release. Money and Schwartz, 'Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism' (n 49) 256. 
191 A detailed account of the early Minnesota experience is found in Hastings, 'Inauguration of a 
Research Project on Transsexualism in a University Medical Center' (n 49). 
192 See text accompanying n 115. 
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Although the doctors did not perform the procedure, the Hopkins group and 
their colleagues across the country saw the existence of the court order as 
significant. 194  Pauly described this court order as having “protected the 
physicians and hospitals involved against legal consequences. This ruling 
permitted the foundation of the Gender Identity Committee at the Johns Hopkins 
Hospital.”195 
The persistence over time of the chilling effect associated with this period of 
legal uncertainty is disputed. Joanne Meyerowitz claims that by the late 1960s, 
“doctors and lawyers had ceased using the mayhem statutes as an excuse to 
refuse sex reassignment surgery.”196 Certainly by 1971, Harry Benjamin—who 
was involved in many American cases—was apparently satisfied that there were 
no legal impediments, and discussed the issue assuming that the procedure was 
entirely lawful.197 In the same year the leading British surgeon John Randell 
complained that “the law on this is not clear, neither is it going to be clear, to 
some extent, after tomorrow. It is almost dangerous for us to undertake surgery 
in these cases.” He nevertheless continued to carry out selected procedures.198 
Robert Kouri reported that the chilling effect of mayhem statutes continued into 
the 1970s,199 and this assessment is consistent with the work of Janice Raymond 
                                                        
194 One of the Hopkins group, John Money, was interviewed by Buckley for his 1966 article in the 
New York Times (n 190) in which Buckley wrote that “Experts in the field believe that the Johns 
Hopkins decision that the surgery does not violate legal restrictions on mutilation or ethical or 
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195 Pauly, 'The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation' (n 43) 468. 
196 Meyerowitz, 'Sex Change and the Popular Press' (n 102) 184, n 69. See also, the response of 
the California Attorney General Mosk (n 112).  
197 H Benjamin, 'Should Surgery Be Performed on Transsexuals?' (1971) 25 American Journal of 
Psychotherapy 74. See also, H Benjamin and CL Ihlenfeld, 'Transsexualism' (1973) 73 The 
American Journal of Nursing 457 (also assuming the legality of surgery including orchidectomy). 
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and Susan Stryker.200 For a few scholars, the threat of prosecution lingered long 
after it had ceased to be felt by surgeons.201 
Nonetheless, the strategies previously outlined to bring GRS within the patient-
focused public policy justification by manipulating diagnoses, expanding the role 
of after-care, and focusing on the risk of harm to the patient if GRS were not 
provided gave a few surgeons sufficient confidence to proceed. Both the growing 
number of procedures,202 and undoubtedly the absence of actual prosecutions203 
helped to rebut legal doubts. The number of GRS performed in the US and UK 
slowly built up in the late 1960s, of which after-care cases including cases of 
repair of actual self-harm formed a substantial part.204 A small number of 
specialised clinics in the US and the UK gradually began to offer GRS to 
rigorously selected patients.205  
During the 1970s, inferences drawn from legislative, governmental and judicial 
decisions amplified this growing professional confidence in the lawfulness of 
GRS on the basis of the narrowly interpreted patient-focused public policy 
justification. 
                                                        
200 See text accompanying nn 110-113.  
201 The federal prosecutor Stan Twardy was still arguing in 1980 that “surgeons, performing sex 
change operations, could be prosecuted under existing statutes of mayhem, simple and 
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and some other laws.” Twardy, 'Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism' (n 22) 295. Relatively 
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justification cannot be stretched to include such operations: D Tomkin and P Hanafin, Irish 
Medical Law (Round Hall Press 1995) 109; RS O’Regan, 'Surgery and Criminal Responsibility 
under the Queensland Criminal Code' (1990) 14 Criminal LJ 73, 75. 
202 For example in Corbett v Corbett (n 17) 98, Ormrod J noted that “Dr. Randell [at Charing Cross 
Hospital] has recommended surgical treatment in about 35 cases mostly restricted to castration 
and amputation of the penis”. Randell appeared as an expert witness in Corbett v Corbett. 
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Sex Change' (1974) 53 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery 388, 398. 
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Medical Center 1974). 
Penney Lewis, ‘The lawfulness of gender reassignment surgery’, American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 57, 2017 (forthcoming) 
 41 
Inferring lawfulness 
Formal legal change—judicial decisions or legislation—on GRS was rare in 
common law jurisdictions.206 The culture of secrecy and anonymity made 
prosecution unlikely unless those involved chose to invite it. Although doctors 
and lawyers anticipated test cases in both the UK207 and the US,208 they did not 
occur. The fear was not only of prosecution itself;209 campaigners also worried 
that a negative decision would set a precedent for future cases.210 The courts 
could not be avoided entirely though, as patients needed to change their gender 
status after GRS, and to resolve legal complications in relation to marriage, 
children and inheritance. The high cost of GRS also led some patients towards 
the courts to challenge administrative decisions not to provide funding for it.  
Legislation explicitly permitting GRS also failed to materialise, likely due to low 
demand and legislators’ desire to avoid “dealing with sexual matters”.211 
Legislators and governments were more comfortable dealing with the issue of 
GRS more obliquely, by addressing the legal implications of the surgery after it 
was performed, or the issue of funding.  
From such judicial, administrative and legislative decisions, the inference could 
be drawn that GRS must be lawful. The strength of the inference would depend 
on the reach of the legislation, administrative or judicial decision. A very strong 
inference of legality could be drawn from national legislation providing funding 
                                                        
206 For examples involving other new and controversial medical procedures, see Lewis, 'The 
Medical Exception' (n 9) 364. An example of formal legal change on GRS is found in the Spanish 
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Code 1995, art 156. 
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for the procedure,212 or permitting birth certificates to be changed.213 The 
pattern found in the United States, Canada and (to a lesser extent) the United 
Kingdom, was of judicial decisions of lesser reach, and legislation or 
administrative decisions at a state or provincial rather than national or federal 
level. The inferences which could be drawn were less strong, but as they 
accumulated, doubts about legality receded.  
In many US states and Canadian provinces, one of the main indications of legality 
was the decision to permit birth certificates to be altered following GRS. If the 
legality of GRS was subsequently questioned during judicial proceedings, the 
public policy justification could then be judicially interpreted in light of the 
relevant governmental or legislative decision to authorise this change of legal 
status, most obviously by using the public-focused public policy justification.214 A 
rare example of early judicial recognition of such an inference is found in City of 
Chicago v. Wilson, in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that a local ordinance 
prohibiting a person from wearing clothing of the opposite sex with intent to 
conceal the wearer’s sex constituted an unconstitutional interference with the 
defendants’ liberty interests. The majority reasoned that:  
[t]hrough the enactment of section 17(1)(d) of the Vital Records Act 
…, which authorizes the issuance of a new certificate of birth 
following sex-reassignment surgery, the [state] legislature has 
implicitly recognized the necessity and validity of such surgery.215  
In the language of the public-focused public policy justification, as the legislature 
had decided to issue new birth certificates to post-operative transsexuals, the 
                                                        
212 As was the case in for contraceptive sterilisation after the passage of the National Health 
Service (Family Planning) Amendment Act 1972. See P Lewis, 'Legal Change on Contraceptive 
Sterilisation' (2011) 32 Journal of Legal History 295. 
213 See, eg, Skegg, Paterson and Manning, Medical Law in New Zealand (n 27) [5.3.4(2)]. 
214 See, eg, ibid. 
215 City of Chicago v Wilson 369 NE2d 522, 533-534 (1978, Ill SC).  
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judge could infer that there was “just cause” for GRS, or that it was undertaken 
for a “lawful purpose”.216 Commentators also drew such inferences. In an 
internationally influential 1971 US law review article,217 Douglas K. Smith argued 
that “it is very unlikely that these states’ legislatures would enact such a 
provision if they considered the surgery itself illegal.”218 
Alternatively, legality could be inferred from legislative or governmental 
decisions to provide state funding for some or all patients. Smith drew this 
inference from the British government’s decision to fund GRS: “An 
administrative decision favoring the legality of [gender reassignment] surgery 
apparently has been made, since the operation may now be paid for by Britain’s 
National Health Insurance plan.”219 In fact the funding of GRS in the UK was 
much less formally clear than Smith suggested, although GRS was informally 
available on the National Health Service in the 1970s.220 
Another possibility was to infer legality from the decisions of judicial or 
professional regulatory bodies where GRS formed part of the factual background 
but its lawfulness was not directly in issue. The most common illustration of this 
type of inference is the civil, public or administrative law claim in which the 
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underlying legality of the procedure is assumed or (more rarely) directly 
addressed. An example of the latter occurred during the 1970 marriage 
nullification proceedings in Corbett v. Corbett, in which the trial judge used a 
broad patient-focused public policy justification for GRS.221 Such an assumption 
also underlies the 1978 California case G.B. v. Lackner, in which the court held 
that GRS for an MTF transsexual could not be considered “cosmetic surgery” and 
thereby excluded from the state medicaid program for those with a low income 
(Medi-Cal), using a narrow patient-focused public policy justification reliant on 
the risks of suicide and self-harm.222 
As legislative and judicial decisions from which the legality of GRS could be 
inferred multiplied, the doubts about legality receded. Thus the need for legal 
intervention to change the patient’s gender status after GRS had both a negative 
and positive impact. By increasing the risk of exposure it discouraged the 
medical profession from performing GRS. But as legislatures and courts 
gradually permitted such changes of status, the inference that GRS was lawful 
was strengthened. To a lesser extent, the high cost of GRS223 also increased the 
impetus for patients to seek review of funding decisions through recourse to the 
                                                        
221 Corbett v Corbett (n 17) 99, discussed in the text accompanying n 20. Subsequent judicial 
review applications challenging funding refusals in England and Wales have assumed the 
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Co 420 NYS2d 450 (1979, N.Y. Supreme Court). For a contrary view, see Rush v Parham (n 155 
and accompanying text); Casillas v Daines 580 FSupp 2d 235 (2008, SD NY). For an overview of 
all of the relevant federal and state cases, see JM Zitter, 'Gender Reassignment or "Sex Change" 
Surgery as Covered Procedure under State Medical Assistance Program' (2010) 60 ALR6th 627 
(last updated 17 May 2015). 
223 King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual (n 93) 50; Hausman, Changing Sex (n 42) 172. 
Penney Lewis, ‘The lawfulness of gender reassignment surgery’, American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 57, 2017 (forthcoming) 
 45 
courts or legal authorities, and inferences of legality could even be drawn when 
claims for funding were unsuccessful.224  
Conclusion: The role of the law 
The period of legal uncertainty undoubtedly increased the suffering of patients 
and potential patients. The reasons behind the unavailability of the public- and 
professionally-focused public policy justifications contributed to a narrow 
interpretation of the patient-focused public policy justification using the well-
established risks of suicide and self-harm to support a characterisation of the 
procedures as having a net benefit only for those patients at such risk. This 
approach may itself have increased the risk of self-harm amongst the patient 
population, particularly as they came to hear about cases of after-care provided 
following self-harm.  
The hoped-for alternative, more effective, less invasive procedures225 did not 
materialise during the period of legal uncertainty (or indeed in the years since). 
The criminal law had played both an important and primarily malign role prior 
to the eventual public, professional and legal acceptance of GRS.  
The role played by inferences of legality drawn from related civil law decisions 
which bolstered the legal acceptance of gender reassignment surgery has been 
under-explored. These inferences were consistent with public-focussed public 
policy justifications for GRS, which were not restricted in the way that the 
patient-focused public policy justification had been interpreted. Civil and 
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administrative law played a more positive albeit indirect role in interpreting the 
medical exception and its application to gender reassignment surgery.  
 
 
 
